Atheists have many false beliefs if naturalism is true. False consciousness is the rule, not the exception. The overarching argument is evolution. Atheists may believe a lot of things about their own worldviews and behaviors, but in reality they only exist for instrumental reasons. They are aimed at maximizing reproductive fitness. Atheists believe in moral values such as 'murder is wrong' but those are the result of the group side of evolution. The truth is 'not committing murder maximizes my reproductive fitness'. If an atheist wanders into this blog to criticize me then he may think that he is concerned with the truth, but in reality he is signaling intelligence (or developing the skills he needs to credibly signal intelligence). If he were 6'4" and could run a 40 yard dash in 4.5 seconds he's probably be signaling big muscles instead. You dance with the girl ya brung - you signal your comparative advantage.
Atheists may think that they care for their family because they love them, but the real belief is 'caring for my family maximizes my reproductive fitness.' Atheists may think that they aren't racist but in reality they are signaling their membership in the high status group of enlightened and sophisticated people. Atheists may think that they care about the poor but they are really just signaling that they are a good cooperator who is unlikely to free ride upon others.
21 comments:
Now, now, don't lump all of us atheists into the evo-psych brigade. :)
Point well taken, though. While technically this isn't "False Consciousness" (which can only refer to specifically oppressed groups of people) it is roughly the same kind of thing. Their total commitment to current scientific results destroys their ability to coherently be confident in their most cherished beliefs.
Hi Nick,
I'm a Christian who believes in I.D. but I'm still on the evo-psych brigade!
Interesting point about false consciousness. I didn't know that. So are you some of neo-Platonist? Roger Penrose is sort of like that.
Hey Justin,
Interesting, how do you interpret evolutionary psychology in light of your beliefs?
I definitely have no settled metaphysical position... I generally flirt with the Kantian idea that we just can't know what's "really" there in the universe, and that philosophy should generally focus on ethics.
The short answer: theistic microevolution.
The long answer: I do not think you have to take Genesis literally (but even if you did, you don't have to believe that the Earth is 6,000 years old because the Hebrew word Yom means both 'day' and 'age'). After all, Augustine of Hippo disagreed with the literal interpretation back in 400 B.C. and is one of the giants of the Christian faith.
But I do think you have to hold that the origins of life was an act of creation. God did not actualize a world in which an improbable event happened, or in which the orderly process of natural laws led to life. That cannot be harmonized with a creation story even in the metaphorical sense.
The short take on my I.D.: I too believe in panspermia, but I think it was God, not aliens.
Most sophisticated defenders of I.D. believe in microevolution and adaptive change. They just disagree on (1) the origins of life and possibly (2) the origins of complex life as well. Microevolution - adaptive change due to changes in gene frequency or minor mutational changes that are not particularly complex or improbable - are likely. In fact, necessary. Otherwise animals and people could not stay adapted to a changing environment.
This is where I'm a little unorthodox. Most I.D. proponents treat microevolution like that crazy uncle who embarrasses you in public: don't embrace it. Keep it shunted off to the side. I think that's unfortunate because the lessons of sexual selection and group selection are profoundly conservative: abstinence de-escalates the evolutionary arms race for reproductive success and channels it into creating a larger cooperative surplus for society. Moreover, abstinence and lifelong monogamy is a much more egalitarian basis for cooperation than the reproductive caste system used by the eusocial species.
errr, make that 400 A.D.
If you believe in microevolution and that the universe is much older than 6000 years (I'd imagine you accept 20 billion) then why not accept macroevolution. I fail to see a significant difference in the concept of macro and micro other than if the world is 6k that isn't enough time for micro to become macro. On the other hand, if the world is 4-6 billion years old, then why bother with the distinction?
Hi Matt,
If a fully functional eyeball had to appear at all once then unsophisticated critics of evolution would be correct. The odds are astronomically against having so many favorable mutations appear at one time.
Therein lies the rub. This cellular machinery that can build a variety of proteins on the basis of DNA is itself highly complex. But it is essential for evolution to work. No ability to synthesize proteins, no evolution. Werner Arber, who won the Nobel prize in chemistry in 1978, summarized the problem.
1. Life only starts at the level of the functional cell.
2. The most primitive cells require several hundred different specific macro-molecules.
3. It is a mystery how such already complex structures came together.
4. The possibility of a creator, of God, is a satisfactory solution to this problem.
Of course, if you are Richard Dawkins or Daniel Dennet you pull out the "skyhooks and cranes" card. One is out of bounds postulating specified complexity as the explanation for specified complexity. By contrast, evolution works in small steps beginning with simplicity.
The problem is that evolution only works in a fine-tuned universe. That takes us to the multiverse. And I've already pointed out why the mutliverse is a really bad skyhook
P.S. why didn't I title the post that way? "The Multiverse is a bad skyhook" is catchy but "the flaws of the multiverse" is really boring. Oh well.
So you call what you believe microevolution because God is needed as a starting point for cells that can build proteins. I thought when people talked about microevolution they meant change within a species (going from a short-beaked bird to a long beaked bird) and macroevolution is a change from one species to another (like from homo erectus to homo sapien).
If your only rub with mainstream evolution is the starting point, it seems to me like what you believe in can still be called macroevolution. Perhaps I'm being picky with your wording, but I think the distinction is important to make to separate yourself from those you call "unsophisticated critics" who use arguments like the spontaneous human eye you mentioned.
I don't quite know where to draw the line. I'm very impressed with arguments about the difficulty of getting the first living cell. I'm generally unimpressed by arguments about change from one species to the other. But if my position is "God created life" then surely that falls into I.D.
Hi Justin,
Your version of ID is effectively a ‘God-of-the-gaps’ argument. You no longer need God to explain what you call micro-evolution, but you still need God to explain so-called macro-evolution. When future discoveries reveal more about evolution, then your God-of-the-gaps will recede even further. Or do you believe that there is nothing more to learn on this subject? We've reached the end of science.
This is not an anti-God argument, it’s merely pointing out that there’s no place for God in science. God is a science-stopper; something that William Lane Craig failed to understand as well (I once had this argument with him too).
You reference Roger Penrose, but you don’t acknowledge that he wouldn’t support your ID arguments. Have you read Paul Davies? He’s by far the best writer on this topic. I would strongly recommend The Goldilocks Enigma, though God and the New Physics, written over 20 years ago, is also relevant.
I live in Oz, where this atheist/theist debate is pretty well non-existent – we don’t have people claiming intellectual or moral superiority based on a belief or non-belief in God – really refreshing, actually. In other words, it’s irritating at worst, irrelevant at best – no one cares.
Regards, Paul.
Hiya Paul,
When future discoveries reveal more about evolution, then your God-of-the-gaps will recede even further. Or do you believe that there is nothing more to learn on this subject? We've reached the end of science.
You have an implicit premise: the future progress of science will confirm the truth of atheism. I think it will go the other way and confirm the truth of Christianity. For example, the Christian philosopher John Philiponus developed the Kalam Cosmological Argument back in 500 AD or so. He wanted to show that Aristotle was wrong and that the universe was finite. 1400 years later he was proven correct by science. In the entire history of science and philosophy I doubt that anyone has gone farther out on a limb to make a more novel prediction but ultimately been proven right.
Why do you think the future direction of science will go towards Darwin rather than John Philiponus? It sounds to me like that is a statement of faith in the truth of atheism.
You reference Roger Penrose, but you don’t acknowledge that he wouldn’t support your ID arguments. Have you read Paul Davies? He’s by far the best writer on this topic. I would strongly recommend The Goldilocks Enigma, though God and the New Physics, written over 20 years ago, is also relevant.
I didn't realize that I had to accept someone's worldview in order to reference a point that they made! I have read The Mind of God by Paul Davies. I am not familiar with his new book, but I am up to date on modern atheistic defenses of the multiverse. You might want to read this post about why the multiverse doesn't work. Short version: (1) they need fine-tuning themselves, (2) there are some types of fine-tuning they do not explain, and (3) there is evidence to suggest that they are false.
I live in Oz, where this atheist/theist debate is pretty well non-existent – we don’t have people claiming intellectual or moral superiority based on a belief or non-belief in God – really refreshing, actually. In other words, it’s irritating at worst, irrelevant at best – no one cares.
As a Christian my ultimate hope is that atheists will repent their sins and take Jesus Christ as their lord and savior. But failing that, I truly enjoy the repartee. To me, Oz seems boring, not refreshing.
Hi Justin,
I think you missed the point. Science is not about atheism and theism per se, but science by its very nature is an atheistic pursuit. By that I mean you can’t use science to prove or disprove the existence of God and you can’t use God to support a scientific theory, which is exactly what ID does. You don’t have to be an atheist to be a scientist, but you have to be aware that God and science don’t mix. Once you bring God into science you stop doing science because you are effectively saying that we’ve come to the end of science: only God can explain this; which is what you imply in your 1-4 steps about the emergence of cells.
To quote from New Scientist, 9 September 2006, p.13 by Joseph Fessio, provost of Ave Maria University in Florida: ‘There’s a controversy in the United States because there is a lack of awareness of a thing called philosophy.’
What I’ve found on the blogosphere is that very few people seem to appreciate the difference between philosophy and science, and how important that difference is. God is a philosophical question, not a scientific one. You can sometimes use science to answer a philosophical question but you can’t use philosophy to answer a scientific question and that’s what ID attempts to do. Everyone uses science to support philosophical positions, but it doesn’t turn their philosophical position into a scientific one. Yet, that’s exactly what ID claims.
Even the multiverse is a philosophical position where the scientific jury is still out. I tend to agree with Penrose and Davies on that one, but it doesn’t make God the de facto solution. Davies summarises all the current positions on the ‘ultimate explanation of the universe’ at the end of The Goldilocks Enigma - it’s worth checking out. (Even Dawkins treats Davies with respect, by the way.)
So as we learn more about the nature of the universe in all its manifestations, the God question is not going to go away – people will continue to wonder at our existence and if there is a ‘purpose’. But using God as a place marker for our ignorance, which is the ‘God-of-the-gaps’, is not very enlightening and serves neither religion nor science.
Yes, you can reference Penrose without accepting his worldview, but I think you should let your readers know that Penrose’s philosophy, whilst it opposes the multiverse, doesn’t support ID. Penrose is an intellectual giant compared to the rest of us, including Craig (whom you reference in the same post) who, quite frankly, is a joke by comparison.
Oz may be boring – I have spent time in the US, by the way (9 months in 2001, before, during and after 9/11) – but people don’t wear their religion on their sleeve here, and people generally get along without friction or attempting to convert everyone to their religious worldview. It’s called multi-culturalism and it’s worked here for the last 50 years at least.
Regards, Paul.
Hi Paul,
What I’ve found on the blogosphere is that very few people seem to appreciate the difference between philosophy and science
I have found precisely the opposite: atheists are still haunted by the ghosts of logical positivism. You will recall that the driving force of logical positivism was to remove all philosophy from science. No metaphysical assumptions allowed. But it failed and it failed spectacular. No one serious thinks that science can be done free of metaphysical assumptions about reality that a reasonable person, such as a Christian, might dispute.
The ghosts of logical positivism still haunt us because of (1) ignorance, and (2) cynicism - it makes for a convenient club with which to beat theism. Rule it out of the world of rational thought on a technicality.
Falsification is a great example. It holds that all propositions can be falsified or they must be rejected as nonsensical. Assuming that Popper is right and that falsification is a fair definition of how good science is done, then this means that science (1) does not need metaphysical assumptions or even judgment calls, and (2) makes it impossible to have rational or scientific knowledge of God since, as you point out, the existence of God can't be falsified.
Here is the problem with falsification. (1) it is self refuting. The proposition that 'all propositions can be falsified or they must be rejected as nonsensical' cannot itself be falsified. (2) it doesn't work outside of physics very well. The biological and behavioral science cannot be modeled with perfect accuracy. Their subject matter is too complex, so you create simplified models. But this necessarily means that all models can be falsified. Hence the slogan "all models are wrong, but some are useful." (3) it doesn't work well with probabilistic claims. Suppose an event is predicted to happen 99% of the time on one theory but 90% of the time on another. (4) when you get your hands dirty people can make methodolical objections about the quality of evidence and so on.
I like falsification. It is a great tool. And Popper taught us the importance of intellectual risk-taking to the scientific process. But his claim, and the claim of logical positivists before him, and David Hume before them, that science can be done free of philosophy, is simply untrue.
Besides, Christianity can be falsified, as I explained in a previous comment about predicting a finite universe.
Yes, you can reference Penrose without accepting his worldview, but I think you should let your readers know that Penrose’s philosophy, whilst it opposes the multiverse, doesn’t support ID.
The context of my Penrose comment was about platonic realism. Why on earth would it be relevant to insert a disclaimer that Penrose doesn't support I.D.?
people don’t wear their religion on their sleeve here, and people generally get along without friction or attempting to convert everyone to their religious worldview. It’s called multi-culturalism and it’s worked here for the last 50 years at least.
Yes, but Oz does not have the intellectual, religious, or cultural diversity of the United States. The US is a strong outlier in terms of religious faiths among industrialized nations.
Hi Justin,
There is philosophy in science, and sometimes it even leads to a theory, but it’s important to understand the distinction and not confound one with the other, which ID does. At the end of the day, science is an epistemological endeavour, so it is wedded to philosophy – no argument. But, as Bertrand Russell once said, philosophy deals with questions, for which there are often no right or wrong answers. Science, on the contrary, deals in answers all the time, and without the ability to interrogate a subject to find answers, a ‘theory’ remains philosophy. The multi-verse is a case in point.
Popper’s criterion of falsifiability was introduced to eliminate pseudo-scientific theories (he was targeting Freud at the time) whereby anything and everything could be explained without testing. If a scientific theory or hypothesis can’t be tested and be able to fail the test then it’s simply not testable and does not justify the term scientific. It fulfills the point I made above that differentiates philosophy from science: it seeks definitive answers, which philosophy can’t provide. In psychology, evidence is analysed statistically because there are no ‘laws’ of human behaviour like we find in physics. But even chaos theory and quantum mechanics, that are totally probabilistic, obey definite mathematical laws, otherwise we wouldn’t know anything about them at all.
In regards to religion, science is objective (its laws exist independently of what we think) but religion is totally subjective (it is only manifest in the human mind). One is epistemological and one is ontological – they couldn’t be more different, philosophically. Science at one end of the philosophical spectrum deals with the natural world; religion at the other end deals with the transcendental. Arguably, the only bridge between them is mathematics; to quote Penrose from The Emperor’s New Mind: ‘There is something absolute and “God-given” about mathematical truth.’ Mathematical truths are arguably the only ‘transcendental’ truths we will ever know, which, incidentally, is why science is the most successful endeavour of humankind. It should be obvious, by the way, that I’m not a ‘logical positivist’ and neither, I believe, is Penrose.
I take your point, by the way, about Penrose and ID: they were separate posts.
Yes, but Oz does not have the intellectual, religious, or cultural diversity of the United States.
Are you sure about that? I’ve visited the US. Have you visited Australia? Religion is far more overt in the US, but it doesn’t mean it’s more diverse, just louder in some quarters. In Australia, religion is seen as a very private and personal matter.
Regards, Paul.
Hi Paul,
I think we're down to two issues.
Logical Positivism
I discussed why falsification is an inadequate account for knowledge in general and science in particular. Your response is to merely assert the virtues of falsification without defending it against the charges I made. The closest you came was to concede that statistics are used in psychology and quantum mechanics. Does that mean that they are pseudo-science?
Can you specifically deal with the objections: (1) self-refuting, (2) when applied to complex subjects that need simplification, and (3) probability, and (4) auxiliary assumptions about the quality of evidence. (see my previous post for details).
If you can't defend a form of science that categorically rules out metaphysical assumptions, then I do not think you should continue to assert that point.
One final bit of fine print, apropos to your Bertrand Russel quote. I believe in a division of labor between science and philosophy. I'm not asking scientists to study the merits of universalism versus nominalism. I am talking about one particular metaphysical assumption: the assumption of metaphysical naturalism.
Multiculturalism
I'll use abortion as an example, but I could choose others. Do Christians in Oz think that a fetus has a right to life? If the answer is no then Oz's multiculturalism only works when everyone shares a common core of values. If the answer is yes then why aren't they getting involved in politics in order to stop abortion?
Perhaps Christians in Oz are "personally opposed" to abortion but would not dare impose their own private moral beliefs on others. Multiculturalists may approve, but let's think back to the abolition movement (another mass movement led by Christians about the moral status of a group). Should proper multiculturalists be "personally opposed" to slavery, but not impose that belief on others? Of course not. We are not free to decide for ourselves whether or not blacks are persons. So again we are left with the point that multiculturalism rests on a shared core of moral values. In the case of our (perhaps hypothetical) pro-life Christians in Oz, one of those values is 'the unborn don't really have a right to life.'
Hi Justin,
Well, you’re taking this argument off into some interesting directions. The argument that Popper’s falsification criterion is self-refuting is one I’ve heard before, but I ignored it because it’s just nonsense. Popper’s falsification criterion is not of itself a scientific theory, it’s part of a methodology – there is no point in applying it to itself. It’s a criterion that’s adopted to help define what a scientific theory is. To apply it to itself is meaningless at best, nonsensical at worst.
In essence, Popper’s criterion asks the question: is the theory or hypothesis testable? If it’s not testable then it’s effectively a philosophical premise only – it’s actually a very simple idea, and easily demonstrated. A good example is string theory, which can’t be tested. String theory is a mathematical model hoping to find evidence that can make it a valid scientific theory. Science is a dialectic between theory and experimentation or observation, and, in the case of string theory, half the dialectic is missing.
In other words, if you can’t do an experiment or make an observation then you are stopped, which is what we see with string theory, despite 20 years of mathematical investigation. Your points about complexity, probability and auxiliary assumptions are all red herrings, because a theory is either testable or it’s not. If the evidence is contestable, you probably need another experiment, not another theory. And all theories are contingent on finding evidence that may prove them wrong. In reality, if you find evidence contrary to a theory, you have to modify it. That’s why it’s a dialectic. It’s a dynamic process: evidence modifies theories; theories require new evidence.
As for metaphysical assumptions, I assume you mean God, or does the universe have a purpose? These are philosophical questions, not scientific ones. As I said before, in philosophy, questions often don’t have right and wrong answers. In science we look for right and wrong answers, and they determine if the theory is correct, wrong or needs to be modified (as per above). Science is independent of these so-called metaphysical questions – it is not dependent on them for finding answers. On the other hand, people use scientific evidence to support philosophical positions (quantum mechanics is a prime example) but it doesn’t turn those philosophical positions into verifiable scientific theories; a subtle but important difference – Hugh Everett’s parallel worlds theory being a good example.
In answer to your question, the only metaphysical assumption I would make is that the laws of nature obey mathematical rules. That is a metaphysical assumption that science is dependent on.
I’m not sure how we got onto abortion, but it’s a debate that happens in Australia, and the Catholic Church has a well known political view, and it’s something that divides politicians, though not along party lines. A few years back we had a debate (in Parliament) over the legality, or not, of the so-called abortion drug, RU486, and it was decided by a conscience vote, not along party lines.
Regards, Paul.
HI Paul,
Your claim that science is free of philosophical assumptions and your defense of that is based on the fact that falsification does not need them. But your defense of falsification so far has been extremely poor.
Popper’s falsification criterion is not of itself a scientific theory, it’s part of a methodology – there is no point in applying it to itself. It’s a criterion that’s adopted to help define what a scientific theory is. To apply it to itself is meaningless at best, nonsensical at worst.
The ability to sort knowledge into true, false, and pseudo-science is itself a type of knowledge. Thus you are absolutely correct: falsification is nonsensical and should be treated as such.
This is old hat. The exact same thing happened to logical positivism and the verification principle. The only difference is that the verification principle said that knowledge but able to be verified, whereas Popper chose falsified. The collapse of logical positivism was perhaps the most important event in 20th century philosophy, so you are really staking out an unorthodox position.
n essence, Popper’s criterion asks the question: is the theory or hypothesis testable?
Actually, no. It asks if it is falsifiable. But you had to make the switch in order to respond to my point about probability. You can't falsify probabilistic statements but you can test them and show that they are probably not true.
What you need to do at this point is shift from falsification to Bayesian epistemology. That would give you a more robust framework to justify your positivistic outlook. That would let you handle probability and simplified models that aren't even designed to be perfect descriptions of reality. (It doesn't handle auxiliary assumptions about the quality of the evidence, but that's an epistemic limitation for everyone).
But that creates problems because you can apply rules of Bayesian inference to things like the existence of God. A lot of Christian philosophers will cast arguments for the existence of God in Bayesian terms.
Hi Justin,
I have come across Bayesian probability in regard to a Bayesian model of the brain, by a bloke called Karl Friston. It is effectively based on a feedback loop. In fact, I’ve argued that the scientific method follows the Bayesian model, because we modify a theory based on evidence. It’s the dialectic that I referred to in my previous post. It doesn’t contradict or replace Popper’s criterion for testability, however, because falsification is entailed in testability.
If something that is being tested can’t possibly fail the test, then it’s not testable. So Popper’s criterion is all about testability. If the test is always, in principle, infallible, then it’s not a test. Popper’s criterion eliminates theories or hypotheses that always agree with the results no matter what those results are. Are you saying that’s okay?
A theory looks for verification, true, but, ideally, it also makes new predictions. But that assumes it is testable, meaning it may fail in those predictions. Verification, by definition, means that a theory may also fail if it fails to verify. If a theory can only verify and not fail the verification, then it’s not testable. You can’t have one without the other. A test without the possibility of failure is not a test (failure is equivalent to falsification). By rejecting falsification, you are saying that, in principle, a test can never fail, it can only ever be passed.
As for probabilities – in the case of quantum mechanics, if it wasn’t probabilistic, it would actually be proven wrong. And quantum mechanics is the most empirically successful meta-theory ever, as I’m sure you know. Quantum mechanics is falsifiable, which is why John Bell developed his famous Theorem, that has, in fact, been tested many times since. Erwin Schrodinger, in his book, What is Life?, provides a compelling argument that all physics is statistical, and coined the term ‘statistico-deterministic’ to describe what he meant. But this has nothing to do with Bayesian probabilities, and doesn’t make physics untestable – quite the contrary.
I don’t consider psychology a science, by the way. The basis for science is mathematical, and, in psychology, it’s purely statistical, which is the distinction I would make. There are no mathematical laws as we find in physics and chemistry. If it wasn’t for the mathematical basis of science it would not be the epistemological success story it is. So mathematics is the key, even in psychology, as it turns out.
None of this rules out Popper’s criterion, because a theory or hypothesis still needs to be able to fail to be testable. That is just fundamental - a test that can’t fail is not a test – it’s the very definition of testability.
Regards, Paul.
Hi Paul,
I'd like to be more focused in our discussion so can you please follow this format?
1. Falsification is self-refuting. I've argued that falsification refutes itself. The claim 'all empirical knowledge must be able to be falsified or it should be rejected as pseudo-science' is itself a form of empirical knowledge. It cannot be falsified so it should be rejected as pseudo-science. You have responded that falsification is a methodology and methodologies are exempt from this standard. So permit me to get Socratic. How do you know that falsification is the best account of science?
2. Equivocating over falsification. I've pointed out that you can't apply falsification to probabilistic statements, and that statements come with auxiliary assumptions such as about the quality of the evidence and other scientific claims. Thus beliefs cannot be tested in isolation (that is one of the dogmas Quine criticized in Two Dogmas of Empiricism). Your response has been to equivocate. You have started to use the more general term 'testability' as a stand-in for falsification. And in your last post, you argued that falsification and Bayesian statistics are basically the same thing! That is simply false. There are many differences between Bayesianism and falsification, not the least of which is the fact that it is impossible to use Bayesian statistics to actually falsify something!
3. One final question: would you apply falsification to your moral beliefs?
Hi Justin,
There is something fundamental that you’ve never grasped.
If a theory can’t be tested such that it could be proven wrong, then it can’t gain you any new knowledge. In other words, if the evidence or results are neutral, you’ve learnt nothing. I don’t think you understand how fundamentally significant this is. It’s one of the reasons why science is so successful.
All this business about logical positivism and metaphysical assumptions have nothing to do with this argument at all – they’re just smokescreens.
To set the record straight: I never said Bayesian probability and Popper’s criterion are the same thing. I’ve suggested that the dialectic in science could be considered a Bayesian model, because it entails a feedback element, though I doubt that anyone has explored that specifically. Bayesian probabilities are used in game theory (amongst other applications) to make predictions, which, of course, can be falsified.
Regards, Paul.
Hi Paul, sorry for coming back on this 2 months late but I wanted to pick up on your "defense" of falsificationism. I really think you're missing the point. The complete and utter collapse of logical positivism in the 20th century happened for a good reason, and there are many good reasons why there are almost no major philosophers who still subscribe to it. That's because the whole of philosophy of religion, ethics, metaphysics, aethestics etc simply went out the window. The biggest concern to secular philosophers was that of ethics; apparently there was now no such thing as morality, it was a meaningless concept.
But I think that your defense of falsificationism is dishonest. You said, " The argument that Popper’s falsification criterion is self-refuting is one I’ve heard before, but I ignored it because it’s just nonsense. Popper’s falsification criterion is not of itself a scientific theory, it’s part of a methodology – there is no point in applying it to itself. It’s a criterion that’s adopted to help define what a scientific theory is. To apply it to itself is meaningless at best, nonsensical at worst."
Popper's methodology makes a claim about ALL knowledge. If his claim is true, then that is also knowledge. Therefore, it MUST be applied to itself otherwise it is incoherent and self-contradictory. You can't simply say,"Oh this applies to everyone else, just not me." The only way that you can demonstrate propositions such as "All statements are false" or "I never end a sentence with a noun" or "No one can read english". These are all self-contradictory statements, because they themselves do not meet the criterion which they are setting out for truth.
Yet you leave the door open for someone to say one of the above statements, and reply to the criticisms that, "Oh don't be silly, it applies to everything else- just not itself!!" Of course this is absurd, and quite frankly, stupid.
So i don't see why you are defending falsificationism. As justin martyr asked before, would you apply falsificationism to ethics and morality? What does that leave you with? It must be quite hard living your life according to falsificationism though, eh? ;)
Post a Comment